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Abstract 
The German government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German 
government was preoccupied with the creation of a moral hazard that common funds 
would create for banks in those participating countries that had weak banking systems. 
This paper argues that to understand German moral hazard concerns it is necessary 
to look beyond the ideational — notably concerns stemming from German Ordo-
liberalism — and focus on the existing national institutional arrangements that the 
German government sought to protect. German moral hazard concerns stemmed from 
the fear that well-funded German deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) — especially 
those of small savings and cooperative banks — could be tapped to compensate for 
underfunded (and largely ex post funded) DGS in other member states. We thus 
demonstrate that the difficulties facing the construction of an EDIS owe to the 
weakness of the previously agreed harmonisation of national deposit guarantee 
schemes (DGS). This failure to harmonise schemes beyond a low minimal standard 
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can be explained through an analysis focused on national systems. Different existing 
national DGS stem from the different configuration of national banking systems, the 
longstanding relationships among national banks and well-entrenched regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
 
Introduction 
The construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) has been presented 
by the EU Commission and the ECB and a number of economists and economic think-
tanks as a crucial pillar to the construction of Banking Union (Wolff 2016; IMF 
2013a). For many, it is unlikely that an EDIS would ever have to be called upon, due 
to the existence of a system for sharing risk should be sufficient to build depositor 
(and investor) confidence in national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and, 
consequently, national banks (Wolff 2016).1 Despite this confidence, a number of euro 
area member states — led above all by Germany — expressed strong opposition to the 
creation of an EDIS. 
 
This paper explains why the creation of an EDIS has been so particularly challenging. 
First, there was concern regarding the financial imposition upon banks of healthier 
                                                
1  More specifically, the inclusion of depositor preference in the EU’s 2014 Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) means that depositors will only become 
part of the bank’s bail-in if bank losses are very large and claims by more junior 
creditors are insufficient to fill the gap or if financial stability concerns impose losses 
on other creditors above those implied by the need to resolve the problem at minimum 
cost. 
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national banking systems — first and foremost Germany — which would have to 
make a contribution to the EDIS. This commitment to potential financial transfer via 
the banking system as opposed to the public purse — was politically unpalatable for 
policy-makers in these countries. Second, there was the perception of moral hazard 
highlighted repeatedly by the German finance minister, concerning the manageability 
of real and possible bank losses. However, this article focuses upon another 
explanatory factor of national preferences on the EDIS:  the different configuration of 
existing national DGS. Different national DGS were in turn linked to the different 
configuration of national banking systems. Different DGS configuration directed both 
national policy on the difficult revision of the DGS directive and emphasis placed 
upon moral hazard in the formation of national preferences on the EDIS.2 
 
This paper contributes to four main bodies of scholarly literature. First, it adds to a 
small but growing political economy literature on financial systems — starting with 
Zysman’s (1983) pioneering work, followed by Allen & Gale (2000), Busch (2009), 
Deeg (1999; 2010), Hardie & Howarth (2013) and Hardie et al. (2013) which engage 
in a comparative analysis of financial (or specifically banking) systems. Second, the 
                                                
2 The focus on banking system and DGS configuration as the main explanatory factor 
of national preferences does not deny the importance of the legal disagreements to the 
eventual construction of the EDIS. The EU Commission, the ECB and a number of 
member states argued that EDIS was an extension of EU policies to foster economic 
integration and that the EDIS’s legal basis was therefore Article 114 TFEU. Germany 
and a number of other member states argued that the EDIS would be a new European 
financial instrument and thus required Treaty change to adopt. Changing the Treaty 
required a unanimous vote, thus giving Germany the power to veto any proposal. 
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paper contributes to the comparative political economy literature on Varieties of 
Capitalism and the financial and sovereign debt crisis (Hall 2014) and specifically 
national banking systems and the recent crises (Hardie & Howarth 2013; Quaglia & 
Howarth 2013) by examining how the specific features of national banking systems 
directed government preferences on both national DGS, the EU DGS directive and the 
EDIS. Third, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the politics and 
political economy of Banking Union (Donnelly 2014; Howarth & Quaglia 2013, 2014, 
2016; Schimmelfennig 2016; Salines et al. 2012, Spendzharova 2014) which feeds 
into the vast literature on EMU and European economic governance, more generally, 
and national preference formation on EMU, more specifically (for example, Dyson 
2000; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Verdun 2000; Walsh 2000). Fourth, this paper 
contributes to the literature on deposit guarantee schemes dominated by financial 
economists and legal scholars (Ayadi & Lastra 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005, 
2008, 2014; Bernet & Walter 2009). 
  
This paper is organised as follows. We first summarise the main functions and feature 
of DGS and EU legislation on DGS, prior to its 2014 reform. Second, we summarise 
the progress of discussion on the EDIS. Third, we examine the main rationalist and 
moral hazard arguments presented by a number of EU member states to explain 
opposition to the creation of a pan-EU or euro area / Banking Union scheme. Fourth, 
this paper presents the main features of existing DGS in six member states which 
reflect the structure of national banking system. Existing DGS in turn shaped national 
preferences on the revision of the DGS directive and the creation of a pan-EU scheme 
— the subject of the fifth section. 
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The main functions and features of deposit guarantee schemes 
Most of the world’s wealthier countries had statutory DGS schemes prior to the 1990s, 
while some also had voluntary schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005, 2008, 2014). In 
the EU, all schemes had to meet minimal standards set in the DGS directive adopted in 
1994 and then in the revised version which was finalized in June 2014. The original 
DGS directive required all member states to operate a scheme for at least 90 per cent 
of the deposited amount, up to at least €20,000 per person. Most EU member state 
DGS far exceeded this minimal amount. Despite changes to the 1994 directive in the 
aftermath of the international financial crisis and the 2014 revision, national DGS 
specificities continued.  
 
Some EU member states had multiple statutory public or private deposit insurance 
schemes for different types of financial institutions. The DGS could be organized as a 
separate legal entity, or could be under the jurisdiction of the banking supervisor, the 
national central bank, or the Ministry of Finance. Countries could choose to fund DGS 
ex ante by collecting premiums on a scheduled basis, others did that ex post from 
surviving institutions once a bank has failed. Some countries had contingency plans in 
the case of a shortfall of funds to cover deposits that included government support 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005, 2008, 2014). Some DGS used different measures to 
calculate the premiums for different banks so as to take into account the level of risk. 
Domestic banks were covered by the DGS, but not necessarily subsidiaries or 
branches of foreign banks. In the EU, deposits in foreign branches were covered by the 
home-country DGS and deposits in foreign subsidiaries were covered by the host-
country DGS (IMF 2013b). Deposits in branches of non-EU headquartered banks were 
required to join the host country DGS, unless the home (non-EU) countries were 
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recognized as having national DGS similar to the EU’s (IMF 2013b; Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. 2008).  
 
DGS usually insured deposits up to a statutory coverage limit. The level of coverage 
was the level of protection granted in the event of deposits being unavailable under 
national law, not applying coinsurance. The most common form of DGS coverage was 
coverage at the ‘per depositor per institution’ level. However, some countries covered 
deposits per depositor, or per depositor account. Different types of deposits were 
affected differently by DGS. Insured deposits were deposits obtained from eligible 
deposit types when applying the level of coverage provided for in national legislation 
(Bernet & Walter 2009). Coverage of interbank deposits was less common than that of 
retail deposits, the assumption being that financial institutions should be capable of 
monitoring the level of risk of their deposits. However, in times of financial market 
stress, interbank deposits could be guaranteed to encourage the free flow of liquidity 
across banks. 
 
The adequacy of national DGS was severely tested during the international financial 
crisis in 2007-8. In April 2008, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) (2008) — the 
predecessor of the G20’s Financial Stability Board — pointed out that the global 
financial crisis demonstrated the importance of effective DGS. In 2009, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI) jointly issued some Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems. Together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the European Commission, and the European Forum of Deposit Insurers, they 
also issued in December 2010 a methodology to enable assessments of compliance 
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with these core principles. In February 2011, the FSB agreed to include the Core 
Principles in the list of key standards for sound financial systems that deserve priority 
implementation depending on country circumstances. The IMF and the World Bank 
included the assessment of the compliance with these standards in their Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) program (FSB 2012: 2-3). 
 
A pan-European scheme:  on the agenda and off again 
As early as July 2010, as part of its legislative proposal to amend the DGS directive, 
the Commission called for the establishment of a network of guarantee schemes as a 
first step towards a ‘pan-European deposit guarantee scheme’ to cover all EU-based 
banks (Commission 2010: 5). Such a pan-European scheme however presupposed full 
harmonization of national schemes and could only enter into force after a minimum 
fund of 1.5 per cent of eligible bank deposits had been reached in all the member 
states. One of the most contentious provisions in the Commission’s proposed 2010 
directive was the establishment in 2020 of a compulsory mutual borrowing facility 
through which a depleted national deposit guarantee scheme had the right to borrow 
from another national fund. Several member states — notably the German and 
Austrian governments — sought to remove this provision during negotiations in the 
Council. It was feared that the mutual borrowing facility would be the first step 
towards a pan-EU DGS, as explicitly stated by the European Commission (2010) in its 
memo accompanying the proposal — which was even more controversial.  Indeed, 
during the preparation of the proposal for the revised directive in 2010, the 
Commission considered the establishment of a single pan-EU scheme. However, the 
Commission shelved the plan because of German opposition and legal difficulties — 
notably the possible need for treaty change (Commission 2010b). The clause adopted 
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in the DGS directive (Art. 9a) allowed national DGS to transfer credits to other 
national DGS on a purely voluntary basis. Article 12 of the revised DGS directive 
stipulated that national DGS could borrow from each other on a voluntary basis if a 
number of conditions (seven in total) were met. Moreover, the borrowing DGS would 
be under legal obligation to repay the loan within five years, paying interest on the 
amount borrowed. 
 
In June 2012, the ‘Van Rompuy Report’ (also known as the ‘Four Presidents’ Report’) 
included a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a key component of 
Banking Union. The report stated that an EDIS ‘would strengthen the credibility of the 
existing arrangements and serve as an important assurance that eligible deposits of all 
credit institutions are sufficiently insured’ (2012: 4). It also noted that the scheme: 
 
and the resolution fund could be set up under the control of a common 
resolution authority. Such a framework would greatly reduce the need to 
make actual use of the guarantee scheme. Nevertheless, the credibility of 
any deposit guarantee scheme requires access to a solid financial backstop. 
Therefore, as regards the euro area, the European Stability Mechanism could 
act as the fiscal backstop to the resolution and deposit guarantee authority 
(p. 4).  
 
A deposit insurance scheme provides protection to bank depositors, reimbursing the 
deposits of clients of a failed bank up to a certain amount. It is designed to prevent a 
‘bank run’ — that is, panic withdrawals by customers of their bank deposits because 
of fear of collapse. In so doing, it also supports the overall stability of the financial 
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system (Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2012: 8). The issue of deposit guarantee 
schemes is related to the creation of a resolution framework for banks. A range of 
expert observers (including IMF economists) and the EU four presidents argued for an 
EDIS to be a key component of Banking Union. In July 2012, the IMF Executive 
Board argued in favour of Banking Union ‘comprising a pan-European deposit 
guarantee scheme and a pan-European resolution scheme — both backed with 
common resources’. ECB Vice President, Vitor Constâncio (2014) stated that: 
 
[s]uch a scheme would have several benefits. It would be commensurate to 
the centralized supervisory regime, and ensure that decisions that are taken 
on a centralized level affect depositors in all countries in the same way, thus 
ensuring a level playing-field. Depositors would be treated in a uniform way 
across countries, independently of their location and the location of the bank 
to [which] they have entrusted their savings.  
 
Moreover, an EDIS could be more credible and better able to mobilize financial 
resources than national schemes. An EDIS could also undermine the potential 
distortions to the Single European Market created by different national schemes, as 
highlighted during the international financial crisis (see below). 
 
In theory, three main options could have been pursued:  a pan-EU DGS for all banks 
in Banking Union; a pan-EU DGS for all systemically important banks in Banking 
Union; and a system of ‘solidarity’ between national DGS, similar to that initially 
proposed by the Commission for the revision of the DGS directive in 2010. In fact, 
none of these options was pursued:  determined Germany hostility forced the 
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Commission to drop the EDIS off its agenda in 2012 (Financial Times, 12 September 
2012; House of Lords 2012b:  37; 2014:  45). 
 
According to the Financial Times (13 September 2012), the Commission had prepared 
a draft proposing a new agency, the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution 
Authority (Edira), which would control a new European Deposit Guarantee and 
Resolution Fund. Edira would be financed through a regular levy on euro area banks 
and would become the ‘single resolution authority’ for Banking Union, replacing 
national deposit guarantee schemes. Due to German opposition, the proposal for Edira 
was removed and the final Commission document ‘A Roadmap Towards Banking 
Union’ only discusses an EDIS briefly (Financial Times, 13 September 2012). By 
December 2012, the establishment of an EDIS had disappeared from the policy 
agenda. The so-called ‘Van Rompuy Report’ issued in December 2012 only made 
reference to the ‘Agreement on the harmonisation of national resolution and deposit 
guarantee frameworks, ensuring appropriate funding from the financial industry’ (p. 
4).  
 
The issue returned to the EU agenda only in June 2015, EU leaders — including ECB 
president Mario Draghi and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker — endorsed 
the creation of an EDIS in the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ on the future of the 
euro. In the autumn of 2015, the European Commission with the keen support of the 
ECB reintroduced the creation of an EDIS to the EU-agenda (Reuters, 11 September 
2015; Financial Times, 21 October 2015). Commission Vice President, Valdis 
Dombrovskis, pledged the launch of draft legislation on the EDIS by the end of 2015 
as part of a broader policy package he unveiled designed to reinforce the euro. The 
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Commission proposal would, as a first step, involve the establishment of a mandatory 
‘reinsurance’ scheme that would ‘contribute under certain conditions when national 
deposit guarantee schemes [DGS] are called upon’, thus in effect act as a backstop to 
national DGS (Financial Times, 10 September 2015). In late 2017, the adoption of the 
EDIS resurfaced on the Commission’s agenda (EU Observer XX 
 
‘I’m alright Jack’ and the moral hazard argument 
From the Commission’s first proposal of a pan-EU DGS and borrowing mechanism, 
the main line of division was between those countries that feared that their banks 
would become net contributors to the scheme, notably Germany, and those countries 
experiencing major problems in their banking system — for example, Spain and 
Ireland — the banks of which were more likely to resort to the scheme (Howarth & 
Quaglia 2014; 2016; Donnelly 2014). Member state governments that opposed the 
creation of an EDIS did so for two main reasons. The first was opposition to the 
imposition of potential costs to banks (and thus depositors) of member states with 
more stable banking systems. The second was concern for the creation of a moral 
hazard for banks (and thus depositors and potentially regulators / governments) which 
could draw on European funds to support their own schemes.  
 
The German, Dutch, Austrian, Finnish, British and Swedish governments baulked at 
the prospect of their banks and thus potentially depositors underwriting depositors in 
other member states with unstable banking systems. The Finnish government (2016) 
pointed out that:  ‘[d]ifferences between countries in banking sector regulation and 
risks are, however, so big that the benefits and costs of European deposit insurance 
would be unevenly distributed’. For several non-euro area member states — including 
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the UK and Sweden — where the Treasury and / or central bank provided the fiscal 
backstop to deposit insurance schemes — a pan-EU scheme and borrowing 
mechanism was also unacceptable because of the potential implications for the public 
purse and thus taxpayers. The British government opposed the proposal of a mutual 
borrowing facility in the revised DGS directive on the grounds that it posed ‘an 
unpredictable and unacceptable fiscal risk to the UK Treasury’ (House of Commons, 
European Scrutiny Committee 2010-11: 39). 
 
A number of northern European governments expressed moral hazard concerns 
indirectly. The Dutch government, for example, pointed out that: 
  
a final condition for full burden sharing is that banks which are to 
participate in an EDIS and resolution fund must have equal starting 
positions. Before banks can qualify for a European resolution and deposit 
guarantee funding, their financial positions must be comparable 
(Netherlands government 2012, authors’ translation).  
 
However, the most explicit presentation of moral hazard concerns to justify opposition 
to the creation of an EDIS came from the German government. German opposition to 
the EDIS paralleled its reluctance on the creation of the three other pillars of Banking 
Union (Howarth & Quaglia 2016). 3  The German government criticised the EDIS 
                                                
3 It should be noted that moral hazard concerns shaped German government reluctance 
on the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) but did not prevent 
agreement. However, on resolution the German government insisted that the new 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) be created through an intergovernmental side 
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proposal as an unacceptable step towards debt mutualization (Financial Times, 13 
September 2012). All the main political parties in Germany opposed it. The coalition 
agreement between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social 
Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) explicitly rejected the idea 
(Koalitionsvertrag 2013: 94). The German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble 
argued that it was unacceptable that the ‘backstopping of depositors [could] become an 
excuse for banks to behave irresponsibly, potentially leaving German taxpayers to foot 
the bill’ (Financial Times, 10 September 2015). Schäuble placed priority on measures 
to ensure that banks had big enough buffers of capital and debt to absorb financial 
shocks, and that authorities could force losses on creditors without facing litigation, 
should ‘have priority’ (cited in Financial Times, 10 September 2015). Schäuble argued 
that ‘[the German] objective [was] to further reduce banking risks as well as separate 
the risks of banks and state. …  The creation of a single deposit guarantee scheme 
[was] not adequate for this objective’ (Financial Times, 11 November 2015). For 
Schäuble, ‘There [was] a moral hazard problem. As soon as you share risk, the 
decisiveness to reduce risk is lessened. That is what happened over the past few years’ 
(Financial Times, 8 December 2015). In a February 2016 article penned by Ludger 
Schuknecht for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the chief economist of the 
German Ministry of Finance, labeled the EDIS ‘An insurance scheme that only 
ensures problems’ and pointed to the wrong incentives and rising stability risks for 
                                                                                                                                        
agreement rather than EU legislation in order to ensure the maintenance of national 
control over the use of SRF funds to supplement national resolution funding in the 
resolution of banks. The creation of the EDIS however implied automatic access to 
European funds to cover insured deposits in the event of exhaustion of national DGS 
funds. 
14 
 
both national governments and banks that such a scheme would create. In September 
2015, the German government produced a non-paper which pointed out several 
necessary steps forward to make Banking Union a success, without mentioning an 
EDIS (Federal Government 2015). Despite this strident opposition, the European 
Commission published its draft directive in November 2015.  
 
By contrast, France and euro area periphery countries regarded an EDIS as the final 
pillar of Banking Union, necessary to sever the doom loop between banks and 
sovereigns, preventing deposit flights in countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis 
(Reuters, 11 September 2015). For example, the Italian authorities repeatedly pointed 
out that the SSM should be complemented by a SRM and an EDIS because ‘coherence 
was needed between the centralisation of supervision and the management of financial 
difficulties’ in order to achieve the objectives of Banking Union (Szego, 2013: 7, 
authors’ translation). Similarly, the Spanish government emphasized the need to agree 
the basis and the date for the EDIS to complete Banking Union (Rajoy 2013). 
However, prior to mid-2015, these countries focused their efforts on the creation of the 
SRM (and SRF) (Saccomanni 2013), on which there was a proposal under negotiation 
— rather than lobby for an EDIS, which was seen as a lost battle.  
 
National preferences and divergent DGS across the EU 
In Europe, most national DGS were set up as a consequence of a series of banking 
failures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although some countries, for example 
Germany, had set up their system earlier.4 In 1994, the EU issued the DGS directive, 
                                                
4 Between 1977 to 1983, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom set 
up national DGS, and Germany revised its existing system. Following the European 
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which was based on minimum harmonization. The directive also established 
harmonized rules concerning the compulsory participation of branches of non-EU 
banks in national DGS in the host country and the non-participation of branches of EU 
banks in national DGS in the host country, unless they sought to opt in with the aim of 
obtaining extra coverage. However, member state implementation of the directive was 
largely undertaken in ways that were suitable to national banking systems and the 
existing national DGS. Hence, the national DGS remained distinctive (see Garcia and 
Prast 2003; 2004). Table 1 summarises the main differences among national banking 
systems and among the national DGS. 
 
Germany 
The most obvious examples of national banking systems shaping national DGS were 
in EU member states with distinct banking pillars — and notably Germany and 
Austria — where separate DGS and institutional protection schemes were set up by 
commercial, savings, cooperative and other public banks. Furthermore, the German 
and Austrian schemes were largely funded through ex ante bank contributions — that 
is, in advance. This funding model reflected the small size of the savings and 
cooperative banks where ex ante contributions helped to build confidence in the 
deposit guarantee and ex post contributions might be financially unmanageable (IMF 
2011b). 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Commission’s (non-binding) recommendation concerning the establishment of 
national DGS, Italy set up a voluntary scheme for commercial banks in 1987, while 
Italian cooperatives had set up their own voluntary scheme in 1978 (Garcia and Prast 
2004). 
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Germany had two mandatory DGS (private / public banks), two voluntary DGS 
(private / public banks), two institutional protection schemes (one for saving banks, 
Landesbanks and Landesbausparkassen, with several regional and national sub-
schemes, and one for cooperative banks), and one voluntary DGS for building and 
loan associations (Bausparkassen). Commercial banks were part of a statutory, legally 
enforceable, but privately-run scheme supervised by the German Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) — the coverage provided for deposits was €100,000 
and estimated at more than 90 per cent of retail deposits with commercial banks. The 
German Banking Association offered its private commercial bank members additional 
coverage through a private voluntary scheme amounting to 30 per cent of the bank’s 
capital per depositor, constituting a de facto full compensation scheme. This voluntary 
system did not have administrative powers or legal claim to compensation and was not 
supervised by BaFin.  
 
Savings banks and Landesbanks had largely ex ante funded (risk-based) institutional 
protection schemes which were set up under regional arrangements and were coupled 
with additional ex post burden-sharing provisions (Bülbül et al. 2013). Further, 
support could be provided through an inter-regional arrangement among the regional 
schemes and an additional arrangement (that included the Landesbank schemes and 
the state building society schemes), although there was no legal obligation to provide 
assistance (IMF 2011b). Cooperative banks (Volks- and Raiffeisenbanks) were 
members of their own institutional protection scheme run by the Association of 
German Cooperative Banks, which took the lead in resolving failed member banks. Ex 
ante funding (risk-based) could be complemented by ex post funding from member 
banks, although there was no legal obligation to provide assistance. Savings and 
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cooperative banks did not participate in the statutory national DGS except if the 
national supervisor (BaFin) decided that their own schemes failed to fulfil required 
conditions. 
 
The ratio of retail deposits protected under the institutional protection schemes of 
savings and cooperative banks was even higher than in the private sector (IMF 2011b). 
The total coverage under these schemes was also very high in comparison to other 
countries and very broad — it included all the liabilities of participating institutions. 
The institutional protection schemes attracted criticism for weakening market 
discipline and lacking close oversight by BaFin due to their private legal nature (see, 
for example, IMF 2011b). The IMF (2011b) and Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
(2012) both recommended the move towards a more uniform statutory deposit 
insurance regime — strongly resisted by both the savings and cooperative banks, and 
German regional and federal governments. 
 
German (and Austrian) banking associations and individual banks feared that an EDIS 
would impinge upon their sectoral institutional protection schemes (Handelsblatt 7 
November 2012; Kaiser 2012). Moreover, German banks with their well-funded ex 
ante schemes, feared that they would likely become net contributors to an EDIS — 
bailing out depositors in other euro area member states given the widespread reliance 
on ex post funded DGS. This structural reasoning thus also shaped Wolfgang 
Schäuble’s moral hazard concerns regarding banks in those participating countries that 
had underfunded (and largely ex post funded) deposit guarantee schemes.  
 
France 
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The French DGS reflected the highly concentrated French banking system, dominated 
by five large banks, principally in terms of the ‘pay box’ and the limited amount of ex 
ante funds. The DGS in France was managed by the Fund for the Guarantee of 
Deposits and Resolution (FGDR) which, prior to 2013 was the Fichiers des Guichets 
Domiciliatires. The French DGS operated through three mechanisms created to protect 
both depositors and investors:  a ‘pay-box’ scheme for pay-outs to depositors in failing 
insured banks up to a maximum of €100,000 per depositor within 20 days, which was 
in line with but potentially far more generous than the existing EU legislation on DGS; 
a resolution mechanism for ailing banks, designed to reduce the risk of loss to 
depositors; and an investment guarantee scheme providing compensation to clients 
affected by fraud or other losses. 
 
The FGDR was a privately-owned institution funded by approximately 582 
participating banks (end 2014 figures). Banks paid in a one-time contribution to the 
Fund, a yearly fee based on the amount of deposits covered in each institution by the 
Fund, and exceptional contributions if the Fund was depleted due to pay-outs. The 
FGDR could also raise funds in the financial markets. There were no contingency 
credit lines from the government. At the end of 2010, the Fund held slightly above €2 
billion or 0.21 per cent of total covered deposits, rising to just above €3 billion at the 
end of 2014 (IMF 2012b; FGDR 2015). The implementation of the revised DGS 
directive was to raise the recommended ex ante funding target level significantly. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the revised DGS directive agreed in late 2014, the 
FGDR was limited in relation to the total amount of covered deposits. The Fund took 
the view that resolution of a systemically important French bank would not lead to a 
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pay-out to indemnify depositor claims, but rather to resolution measures — for 
instance, facilitating a sale of some assets and liabilities (FGDR 2015). This 
requirement of selling off assets (rather than raising the deposit cover provided) was a 
reflection of the large size of the biggest French banks, which were better positioned to 
sell off assets, than, for example, small German banks. Financial support from the 
FGDR could be used either for compensation to depositors or for recovery actions in 
order to prevent the disorderly failure of a bank. This financial support was not subject 
to an explicit ‘least cost’ criterion — whether the cost of providing financial support 
was likely to be lower or higher than that of a pay-out to depositors in liquidation. 
However, in practice, a ‘least cost’ consideration was seen as inevitably shaping Fund 
decisions (IMF 2012b). 
 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch DGS, the Collective Guarantee Scheme, was established in 1978 and 
existed until reforms in mid-2013 designed to implement the revised DGS directive 
(Garcia and Prast 2003). Similar to France, the design of the scheme reflects the highly 
concentration of the Dutch (retail) banking system. The Scheme was funded ex post 
(through a ‘pay-box’ system) and in the event that available funds were insufficient for 
the full coverage of insured deposits, public authorities were not explicitly authorized 
to provide additional funding. As in France, insured depositors were not given priority 
right over shareholders. Ex-post assessments were made case-by-case based on several 
items of data reported to the central bank. The contribution amounts were determined 
after consultation with the Bankers’ Committee. Only deposits of small enterprises, 
small foundations, and households were protected. The coverage limits were €20,000 
from 1998 to 2008, conforming to the minimum established in EU legislation, and 
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then expanded with the adoption of the revised DGS directive to follow the revised 
required EU minimum amounts. The Netherlands, with its few big banks, only just 
met the EU legal minimum and only ex post. The Rabobank ran its own institutional 
protection scheme with its component banks (small cooperatives), thus rendering less 
necessary additional deposit guarantee requirements, and making the Dutch authorities 
less well disposed towards an EDIS.  
  
Italy 
As in Germany and Austria, the Italian DGS for banks consisted of two schemes 
covering different banking types. One DGS, the Interbank Fund for Deposit Guarantee 
(Fondo Interbancario di Tutela Dei Deposit) was set up by banks incorporated as 
joint-stock companies and cooperative banks; a second the Fund for Deposit 
Guarantee of Cooperatives (Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del credito 
cooperative) was set up by mutual banks. The two DGS were initially established as 
private-law consortia and voluntary systems supervised by the Bank of Italy but 
membership became compulsory with the passage of the first DGS directive in 1994. 
As of 31 December 2012, there were 241 banks participating in the Interbank Fund for 
Deposit Guarantee and 398 in Fund for Deposit Guarantee of Cooperatives (IMF 
2013c). 
 
The two sectoral schemes were primarily entrusted with depositor pay-out in the 
context of bank liquidation, but had a broad mandate to provide guarantees, credits, 
acquire equity and fund purchase and assumption transactions (which concern 
resolution), provided that they were less costly than a pay-out. Such interventions were 
subject to Bank of Italy approval. The DGS were both ex post funded, with 
21 
 
contributions provided by participating banks as and when required. For the Interbank 
Fund for Deposit Guarantee, this amount varied between 0.4 per cent and 0.8 per cent 
of the total covered deposits (end 2012 figures). The total value of covered deposits as 
a percentage of eligible deposits covered by the Interbank Fund for Deposit Guarantee 
was 68.7 per cent, while that of the Fund for Deposit Guarantee of Cooperatives was 
65 per cent (end 2012 figures; IMF 2013c). The revised DGS of 2014 changed the 
level of covered deposits and some bank contributions became ex ante in Italy. 
 
The Italian national DGS was one of the few nation-wide schemes providing deposit 
guarantees in excess of €100,000, thus well in excess of the original DGS directive, 
although with no ex ante bank contributions, which meant that the de facto coverage 
was likely to be lower than the nominal amount guaranteed. The comparative 
generosity of the Italian national system was ascribed to the ‘Italian saving culture’ 
and the fact that the DGS could transfer assets and liabilities and provide financial 
support to banks placed under special administration, as an alternative to the 
reimbursement to depositors, on the basis of the ‘least cost’ principle (Commission 
2007: 64). Moreover, in Italy, the DGS for cooperatives could intervene even when a 
procedure had not been formally initiated (De Polis 2015). The Italian government 
sought to amend the Commission’s proposal revising the 1994 directive in order to 
preserve these distinctive features of the national DGS, and specifically their ‘social 
functions’ and ‘their ability to engage in early intervention in case of crisis’ (Sabatini 
2013, authors’ translation; De Polis 2015).  
 
Spain 
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The DGS in Spain was administered by the Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fondos de 
Garantía de Depósitos), which was a private law entity wholly prefunded by the 
member credit institutions. Until 2011, there were three Deposit Guarantee Funds one 
for each sector of the banking industry (commercial banks, savings banks, and credit 
cooperatives). In the context of Spanish banking crisis, the three sectoral funds were 
merged into a single fund and the premiums were made uniform across the board. 
From 2011, the Deposit Guarantee Fund Management Board consisted of 12 members: 
six from the Bank of Spain and two from each of the three banking sectors, with the 
Bank of Spain Deputy Governor serving as chair (IMF 2012a).  
 
The Deposit Guarantee Fund could be funded in four ways: by ordinary annual 
contributions, extraordinary contributions, by issuing bonds, or by borrowing from 
third parties, including the government or Spain’s Fund for Orderly Bank 
Restructuring created in 2009 to transfer public funds to Spanish banks. When the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund assets reached a level equal to or greater than one per cent of 
total deposits (approximately €10 billion), bank contributions were to be discontinued. 
The accumulated assets of the Deposit Guarantee Fund remained low because of the 
poor state of the Spanish banking system. In 2012, the IMF recommended an explicit 
backstopping from the Spanish state (IMF 2012a). 
 
The Deposit Guarantee Fund had the objective of guaranteeing bank depositors either 
through pay-outs or through financial support — subject to approval of the Bank of 
Spain based upon a ‘least cost’ analysis — aimed at restoring the viability of banks. 
The range of financing mechanisms that the Deposit Guarantee Fund could deploy was 
broad and included both liquidity and solvency support (IMF 2012a). Such financing 
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varied from credit lines, guarantees, subordinated loans or subsidies to a bank, to the 
acquisition of bad assets, to the injection of capital for mergers take-overs, or support 
for asset and liability transfers. In case of bankruptcy, the Deposit Guarantee Fund was 
to appoint the liquidator, thus controlling the pay-out process. In case of bank 
liquidation, neither the Deposit Guarantee Fund nor depositors enjoyed any 
preferential rights over the estate of a failed bank (IMF 2012a) — at least prior to the 
implementation of the revised DGS directive.  
 
The UK  
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) was independent of both 
government and the financial industry but accountable to the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority of the Bank of England (and prior to 2012, the independent Financial 
Supervisory Authority). The FSCS managed five protection schemes for different 
categories of customers, one of those being insured depositors in deposit-taking 
institutions (IMF 2011a). As in France, there were no distinct schemes for specific 
categories of banks, reflecting the domination of the national retail banking market by 
a small number of institutions. Also, reflecting the high concentration in retail 
banking, the scheme for insured depositors was ex post funded in that when it incurred 
costs, the member banks would be required to cover these costs on a pro-rata basis (a 
share of protected deposits up to the compensation limit per individual depositor per 
authorized bank). In a pay-out situation, the FSCS also had unlimited access to borrow 
from the National Loans Fund administered by the Treasury with the accounts 
maintained at the Bank of England. Thus, unlike the euro area member state DGS, the 
FSCS had a fiscal backstop, as with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
in the United States. 
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FSCS funds could be used to:  pay-out to depositors if a bank failed; finance the 
transfer of insured deposits to another institution under the bank insolvency procedure; 
and, using the Scheme’s stabilization powers, contribute to a non-payout resolution of 
a failed bank. In this last case, the FSCS could only act upon the order of the UK 
Treasury and intervention had to be based on the ‘least cost’ option (IMF 2011a). In 
the context of bank resolution, the FSCS ranked pari passu with unsecured creditors. 
As in France and the Netherlands (and a number of other EU member states), the UK 
did not have official depositor preference prior to the finalization of the DGS directive 
in June 2014 — that is, the FSCS did not give depositors a preferential ranking in 
insolvency (PRA 2014). However, the Bank of England’s Special Resolution 
Regime’s tools and powers were expected to be used so as to achieve a similar 
outcome to depositor preference. All banks were required to have account systems 
allowing a ‘single depositor view’ — i.e., that all deposits pertaining to a depositor 
could be easily summed up and presented in a list (IMF 2011a). 
 
Negotiating the revised DGS directive 
The DGS directive of 1994 set the minimum level of deposit protection schemes in the 
EU at €20,000 per depositor. However, as the 1994 directive was based on minimum 
harmonization, national deposit guarantee schemes continued to differ in several 
important respects, such as the definition of eligible deposits, the level of cover, the 
types of funding mechanism and the calculation of bank contributions. The global 
financial crisis that accelerated in late 2008 brought into the spotlight the inadequacy 
of the 1994 directive (Ayadi & Lastra 2010).  
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To begin with, the minimum level (€20,000) was considered by many to be too low to 
placate fears of a bank run, especially given that a number of member states provided 
a considerably higher legal minimum (Ayadi & Lastra 2010). Deposit protection 
coverage varied markedly across the EU, ranging from the legal minimum in most of 
the new member states and the UK to more than €100,000 in Italy and France. 
Furthermore, uncoordinated decisions on deposit guarantees taken by some member 
states at the height of the crisis in late 2008 (notably in Ireland and Germany) 
worsened the crisis (Quaglia et al. 2009). It became evident that different national 
schemes across the EU potentially distorted level playing field competition and 
created the potential for bank runs because, in the event of financial crises, customers 
in some member states were prone to shift deposits to banks headquartered in those 
member states with more generous guarantee schemes. 
 
At the peak of the international financial crisis in late 2008, the Commission proposed 
legislative changes to the DGS directive. These changes — agreed hurriedly in 2009 
— represented an emergency measure designed to restore depositors’ confidence by 
raising the minimum level of coverage for deposits from €20,000 to, initially, €50,000 
and subsequently to €100,000. The need for swift action meant that several 
controversial issues were not tackled and hence the directive contained a clause 
providing for a broad review of all aspects of deposit guarantee schemes. By 2010, 
schemes continued to vary markedly across the member states and only 16 out of 27 
applied the coverage level of €100,000, or had legislation in place to do so 
(Commission 2010). When the sovereign debt crisis broke out in the euro area in late 
2009, the operation and limited harmonisation of national DGS came back onto the 
agenda. In July 2010, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend 
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again the DGS directive with a view to promoting the ‘harmonization and 
simplification of protected deposits, a faster pay-out, and an improved financing of 
schemes’ (Commission 2010: 5). 
 
The German government opposed the Commission’s harmonisation efforts to the 
extent that they menaced the country’s self-regulated voluntary DGS (Moloney 2011). 
German commercial, savings banks and cooperative banks, which each had their own 
sector-specific institutional protection schemes which also provided funds for deposit 
guarantees, opposed the Commission’s proposal because they feared that they would 
be forced to establish a second fund based on ensuring deposits (Donnelly 2014). 
These voluntary sectoral schemes provided indirect protection to depositors, whereas 
the Commission’s proposal called for the creation of funds that specifically covered 
depositors.  
  
The Commission’s push in favour of ex ante funding for DGS stemmed from 
widespread economic opinion (IMF 2013b). The IMF (2013b) discouraged schemes 
based on ex post funding on the grounds that failing banks would not contribute to the 
guarantee of their own depositors. Moreover, the IMF (2013b) feared that ex post 
schemes could be damaging to a banking system, hitting up banks for contributors to 
support depositors of a failed bank in difficult economic times when banks could least 
afford it. Opponents of the introduction of ex ante schemes argued that ex ante 
payments would hit banks hard during a difficult period and would further destabilize 
euro area periphery banking systems (IMF 2013b). Moreover, the UK, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, which had national DGS based on ex post funding, were unhappy about 
the Commission’s proposal on the compulsory adoption of ex ante funding for DGS, 
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as this would have meant having to raise funding from the national banking industry, 
hence imposing extra costs for the banks (interviews, Commission officials, Brussels, 
May 2013).  
 
Finally, all member states, but particularly those with low existing coverage and ex 
post funded DGS, opposed the target level and transition period proposed by the 
Commission. The initial Commission’s proposal had been 1.5 per cent of eligible 
deposits in 10 years, whereas the European Parliament sought a target level of 1.5 per 
cent of covered deposits in 15 years, and the compromise text agreed by the Council 
indicated a target level 0.5 per cent of covered deposits in 15 years. On pay-out, the 
Commission proposed 7 days, the Parliament 5 working days, with some national 
discretion until 2016 and an immediate emergency payment of €5000, while the 
Council agreed a pay-out in 15-20 working days. The initial Commission proposal 
contained ‘risk-adjusted premiums’ with a strict EU-wide model. Most member states 
(and the Council) argued in favour of full flexibility in the choice of model, with 
different degrees of European Banking Authority (EBA) involvement in the 
establishment of DGS guidelines. The Commission proposed a limited use of funds, 
whereas most member states (and the Council) sought unlimited use.  
 
The final stage of the negotiations on the revision of the DGS directive took place in 
2013 in a trialogue between the Council, Parliament, and Commission, with several 
controversial issues outstanding. The revised directive was eventually agreed in April 
2014 by including several compromises in order to iron out the most controversial 
issues between the European Parliament and the Council, as well as among member 
states. The target level for ex ante funds of DGS was set at 0.8 per cent (in between 
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what was proposed by the EP and the Council) of covered deposits (i.e., about €55 
billion) to be collected from banks over a ten-year period. Repayment deadlines were 
to be gradually reduced from 20 working days to 7 by 2024 (here again the 
gradualness was a compromise) (Commission 2014).  
 
The target funding level of 0.8 per cent of covered deposits was the minimum level 
required by EU law. Member states were left free to set higher target levels for their 
national DGS. In 2014, schemes in about half of member states had already reached 
the target level (or were above or relatively close to it). According to the Commission 
(2014) in one-third of member states, DGS funds were above one per cent of covered 
deposits, and in a few of them, they were even above two per cent. Upon approval of 
the Commission, member states could set a target level lower than 0.8 per cent (but 
not lower than 0.5 per cent of covered deposits) if the characteristics of the banking 
sector (for example, concentration of most assets in a few banks) made it unlikely that 
banks would be liquidated using the DGS — rather they would be resolved 
(Commission 2014). This was a concession to the Netherlands, with its highly 
concentrated banking system, as well as to France, with its five very large banks 
(Bloomberg, 18 December 2013). 
 
In order to appease those member states with ex post payment systems — notably the 
UK, Italy, and the Netherlands — the revised directive envisaged the possibility of 
‘payment commitments’ of a bank towards a DGS fully collateralized by low risk 
assets. The total share of payment commitments was not to exceed 30 per cent of total 
DGS funds. In order to appease countries such as the UK that had adopted bank levies 
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in the aftermath of the international financial crisis, member states were allowed to 
consider bank levies as equivalent to ex ante funds.5  
 
In order to cater for the needs of sectoral protection schemes in place in Germany and 
Austria, the revised directive gave them the choice of being officially recognized as a 
DGS (and thus be subject to all provisions of the DGS directive), or they could 
continue their activity as purely institutional protection schemes. In the latter case, 
they would not be subject to the directive, but member banks would have to also 
contribute to an official DGS in that member state. In order to appease banks that were 
members of voluntary sectoral schemes, their lower risk linked to mutual protection 
could be taken into account when risk-based contributions to DGS were calculated.  
 
The contributions to DGS were to be based on the amount of covered deposits and the 
degree of risk incurred by the respective bank member. Member states could set lower 
contributions for low-risk sectors governed by national law. In order to ensure 
consistent application of the DGS directive in member states, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) was to issue guidelines to specify methods for calculating the 
contributions to DGS. These guidelines were published in May 2015 (EBA 2015). In 
its ‘feedback on the public consultation’ (pp. 66ff), the EBA noted that respondents 
supported the mandatory ex ante collection of contributions on the grounds that this 
would work to strengthen confidence in DGS across EU member states.  
 
                                                
5 The term ‘bank levies’ refers to, for example, the mandatory contributions paid by 
banks to the State budget for the purpose of covering the costs related to systemic risk, 
failure, and resolution of institutions. 
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However, the EBA also noted the importance that respondents placed upon flexibility, 
‘due to the variety of national banking structures throughout the Union’ (2015: 66). 
The EBA ‘acknowledge[d] the difficulty of developing a methodology which [would] 
cater for the specific features of banking structures of all Member States’ (2015: 66). 
There was also concern that the EBA guidelines would not allow sufficient flexibility 
for voluntary sectoral protection schemes (as for German savings banks) since the 
formula for the guidelines were based predominately on covered deposits. The EBA 
(2015) responded by promising further modification to the guidelines so that they 
would be amended to take into account important features of institutional protection 
schemes (for example, their business model and risk profile).  
 
In 2015, there were ongoing debates as to the composition of EU-wide core risk 
indicators which were to determine bank contributions to DGS. Differing bank and 
government positions stemmed from bank business models and structural differences 
in national banking systems and / or different regulatory and supervisory practice. The 
absence of a universal definition of the nonperforming loan ratio was seen as a major 
problem that could undermine harmonized implementation. The EBA had initially 
proposed a non-risk weighted leverage ratio (in addition to risk-weighted measures). 
However, several member state governments and numerous banks criticized this 
proposal, especially given that the introduction of a non-risk weighted leverage ratio 
would disadvantage undercapitalized banks and notably alternative banks that did not 
issue equity, thus hitting different EU banking systems unevenly — notably, Germany 
more and the UK less. There were similar debates on the respective merits of Return 
on Assets measures (adopted by the EBA) — which might disfavour alternative banks 
— versus Return on Equity. It was also argued that using risk-weight assets would 
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favour banks that used the Internal Ratings Based (IRB)-approach and disfavour banks 
that use the standardized approach when calculating risk-weight assets (EBA 2015: 
67). In each case, the precise standard adopted would have significant effect upon the 
contributions of individual banks and member state banking systems more generally. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the principal missing component of Banking Union. The 
EDIS was initially listed as one of the four pillars of Banking Union — along with the 
single rule book, supranational supervision and resolution — but was subsequently 
shelved because of disagreement amongst the member states, and notably because of 
German opposition. In 2014, the 1994 directive harmonizing national DGS was 
substantially revised. Although relaunched by the Commission in a November 2015 
draft directive, at the time of writing (autumn 2017), the directive has yet to be agreed 
by the member states.  
 
Journalistic reporting on German preferences on the EDIS has stressed moral hazard 
concerns and the feared imposition of costs upon banks in healthier banking systems, 
and ultimately the manageability of real and potential bank losses. Ostensibly, in 
countries with ailing banking systems, the risk of having to resolve banks by resorting 
to resolution funds and national DGS was much higher than in countries with healthier 
banks. For Germany the poor state of public finances in the euro area periphery also 
increased the likelihood that the costs of resolving ailing banks would have to be 
mutualized and born by all the euro area member states, not just by the home country.  
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However, this paper also presents the argument that national preferences on the EDIS, 
were determined largely by the structure of existing national DGS, which in turn were 
closely linked to the configuration of national banking systems. All this made EU 
negotiations on both the revised DGS and the EDIS difficult. The German (etc.) 
government’s moral hazard concerns also stemmed from the fear that a number of 
member states would have difficulty meeting the target level for ex ante contributions 
from banks to national DGS agreed in the 2014 revised directive. The German 
government feared pressure to construct an EDIS even though some member states 
had very little in the way of ex ante funds. For the German government, the potential 
for moral hazard for both depositors, banks and governments in euro periphery 
countries was clear.   
 
The German government was also in effect opposed to imposing a potential burden 
upon the joint liability schemes of small German (etc.) alternative banks to support the 
DGS in other member states, and thus to fund depositors of potentially large banks. 
The importance of banking system structure also becomes clear in the European 
Commission’s efforts to diminish German opposition to the EDIS. The Commission 
proposed that savings and cooperative banks be made exempt from having to 
contribute to the EDIS (Reuters, 2 November 2015). Commission President Juncker 
argued that it was ‘people who did not follow the virtues of a social market economy’ 
who caused the financial crisis and that savings banks and cooperative banks were not 
to blame (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 November 2015). However, this 
concession did not result in a shift in German policy, given ongoing concerns about 
the funding arrangements of DGS in a number of euro area member states. 
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This political economy analysis contributes to the growing body of academic literature 
on Banking Union by explaining national preferences on both the revised DGS 
directive and the EDIS. These preferences are derived not only from the overall health 
of national banking systems. They also reflect the structure of national banking 
systems and pre-existing national DGS. Despite more than sixty years of financial 
integration in the EU and significant strides forward in the single financial market in 
recent years, national banking systems remained very distinct, complicating the 
negotiations on both the revised DGS directive the EDIS and ensuring the persistence 
of national variation. 
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Table 1.  National banking systems and deposit guarantee schemes (DGS); government positions on revised DGS directive and EDIS 
 
 Concentration of 
banking system 
Presence of 
alternative 
banks 
DGS system-
wide or sector-
by-sector 
Ex ante or Ex 
post funding 
(pre-2014) 
Position on 
revised DGS 
directive 
Position on EDIS 
France Very high High but in semi-
consolidated 
groups 
System-wide Ex post (‘pay-
box’) 
Opposed to ex 
ante increase, but 
accepted with 
qualifications 
In favour 
Germany Very low High (over 50% 
of bank deposits) 
Sector-by-sector Principally ex 
ante with ex post 
Ex ante increase Opposed (firmly) 
Italy Very low Low Sector-by-sector Ex post (and 
generous) 
Opposed to ex 
ante increase 
In favour 
Netherlands Very high Moderate 
(Rabobank) but in 
semi-consolidated 
groups 
System-wide Ex post Ex ante increase 
accepted with 
qualifications 
Opposed 
(moderately) 
Spain Mid-range Low, cajas 
operate as 
commercial banks 
System-wide Ex ante but 
under-funded 
Opposed to ex 
ante increase 
In favour 
United Kingdom Very high (retail 
banking) 
Very low System-wide Ex post Ex ante increase 
accepted with 
qualifications 
Reluctant; UK 
non-participation 
 
 
 
